THE SILK ROADS FROM THE PAST
TO THE FUTURE AND
THEIR INTERACTIONS WITH THE
FOREIGN TRADE OF TURKEY
CONTENTS
Abstract/Özet
Introduction
1. The Historic Silk Road
1.1. History of the Silk Road
1.2. Commercial Structure of the Historic Silk Road
2. The Modern Silk Roads
2.1. Birth of the New Silk Roads
2.2. International Initiatives and the New Silk Roads
2.3. Commercial Potential of the New Silk Roads
3. The Silk Roads and Turkey
3.1. The Role of Turkey in the Historic Silk Road
3.2. The Role of Turkey in the New Silk Roads
3.3. The Impact of the New Silk Roads on Turkey’s Foreign Trade
Conclusion
Bibliography
Abstract
Transportation is a major factor in trade. Commercial activities can be
increased in parallel to improvements in transportational infrastructure. The
Silk Road functioned in this manner historically and played a paramount role in
the development of international commerce. In this context it proved vital in
the execution of intensive commercial activities, initially between Asia and
Europe, and later in Africa. Although the Historic Silk Road lost its
significance in the late 17th century, it is currently being revitalised. In
this context economic and political collaboration between nations is sought
through a variety of initiatives - the so-called New Silk Roads. Major among
such initiatives are oil-natural gas pipeline projects (OPP-NGPP), Transport
Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA), the Northern Distribution Network
(NSR-NDN), the Trans-Korean Railroad with the Trans-Siberian Railroad
(TKR-TSR), and the Gulf-Asia Model: Turkey is actively involved in most of
these. In this paper, brief information about such initiatives is offered and
their de facto and potential effects on the foreign trade of Turkey revealed.
Data show that such initiatives (excluding the TKR-TSR and the Gulf-Asian Model
due to their distance) have positive effects on Turkey’s foreign trade.
Key Words: The historic silk road, The
new silk roads, Oil-natural gas pipeline, Transportation, Foreign trade.
GEÇMİŞTEN GELECEĞE İPEK
YOLLARI VE TÜRKİYE’NİN DIŞ TİCARETİ İLE ETKİLEŞİMLERİ
Özet
Ulaştırma, ticaret faaliyetinin temel unsurlarındandır. Şayet ulaştırma
imkânları gelişmişse ticarî faaliyetler de buna paralel olarak artırılabilir.
İpek Yolu da tarih boyunca bu fonksiyonu icra etmiş ve uluslararası ticaretin
geliştirilmesinde önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Bu kapsamda Tarihî İpek Yolu, önce
Asya ve Avrupa daha sonra Afrika kıtaları arasında kara ve deniz yoluyla yoğun
ticarî faaliyetlerin icrasına imkân sağlamıştır. 17.yüzyılın sonlarında önemini
kaybetmesine rağmen, Tarihî İpek Yolu, bugün farklı formlarıyla canlandırılmaya
çalışılmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, uluslar arasında Yeni İpek Yolları adı altında
birtakım inisiyatifler vasıtasıyla iktisadî ve siyasî işbirliklerine
gidilmektedir. Bunların başlıcaları petrol-doğalgaz boru hattı projeleri
(PBHP-DGBHP), Avrupa-Kafkasya-Asya Ulaşım Koridoru (TRACECA), Kuzey Dağıtım Ağı
(NSR-NDN), Kore-Sibirya Demiryolu (TKR-TSR) ve Körfez-Asya Modelidir. Türkiye
bunların önemli bir kısmında fiilen yer almaktadır. Bu çalışmada, söz konusu inisiyatifler hakkında kısa bilgiler verilmekte ve
bunların Türkiye dış ticaretine fiili ve muhtemel etkileri ortaya konmaktadır.
Veriler göstermektedir ki bu inisiyatifler (uzaklıkları dolayısıyla TKR-TSR ve
körfez-Asya Modeli dahil edilmemiştir) Türkiye’nin dış ticaretine olumlu
etkilerde bulunmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Tarihî ipek yolu, Yeni ipek
yolları, Petrol-doğalgaz boru hattı, Ulaştırma, Dış ticaret.
Introduction
As both an iconic symbol and a source of wealth, silk was important as one
of the most valued products carried on the interconnecting routes between continents.
Thus, this internationally desirable product played a significant role in the
establishment of relations between countries, while its name became
inextricably linked with the routes along which it was transported from the
second century BC to the late 17th century. At that point its value diminished
with the rise of new methods of transportation; roads, railways, and seaways.
The 19th century saw a resurgence of interest in the history and potential use
of the Historic Silk Road and its peripheral regions. With the exploration for
oil and natural gas reserves -which involved much of the world in the search
for potential collaboration with source and other user countries- the concept
‘the Modern Silk Roads or the New Silk Roads’, in the sense of their
revitalisation, was born. The context being different, however, the term ‘the
New Silk Road’ contains several meanings depending upon the
views/aims/projections of the countries and/or country groups on the region.
Many international initiatives have been launched with the aim of
benefiting from the resources located in the centre of the Historic Silk Road
Region. The most important of these are the so-called Asian Silk Road [oil and
gas pipeline projects (OPP-NGPP)], the European Silk Road (TRACECA), the
American Silk Road (NSR-NDN), the Korean-Russian Silk Road (TKR-TSR), and the
Gulfian Silk Road (the Gulf-Asia Model). The main factor for the establishment
of the said initiatives is the presence of oil and natural gas. Turkey is
involved in most of such initiatives in terms of the economic and political
aspects. In this paper, the New Silk Roads on the routes of the Historic Silk
Road are studied and their potential for the countries involved, particularly
Turkey, is revealed. In this context, de facto and potential effects of these
initiatives are studied in terms of Turkey’s foreign trade. The data gathered
show that the effects of such initiatives are positive.
Material and method
This is a desk study, materials for which are books, articles, and statistics.
The paper consists of three sections. The first of these is a brief history of
the Silk Road and its commercial structure. The second is on current
international initiatives on the Historic Silk Road, namely the New Silk Roads
and their commercial potential. The last section includes the role played by
Turkey with regard to both of the above in the Historic and New Silk Roads. In
this context, the impact of the New Silk Roads on Turkey’s foreign trade is
studied.
In order to demonstrate the effect of such initiatives on Turkey’s foreign
trade, all countries were classified according to their involvement in the
projects. In this context, by using the crude oil transportation data of
2002-11 gathered from the Petroleum Pipeline Corporation of Turkey (BOTAŞ) and
foreign trade data from 1996-2012 provided by the Statistical Institute of
Turkey (TÜİK), the de facto effects of currently active projects i.e. the
‘Kerkuk-Ceyhan’ and ‘Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan’ Crude Oil Pipeline Projects (COPP)
and the potential effects of other international initiatives (excluding TKR-TSR
and the Gulf-Asian Model due to their distance) i.e. ‘Natural Gas Pipeline
Projects (NGPP), ‘Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA)’, and the
‘Northern Distribution Network (NDN)’, are found to be positive for Turkey’s
foreign trade.
1. The Historic Silk Road
1.1. History of the Silk Road
The Historic Silk Road flourished for approximately 1,700 years as the most
important network of trade routes in history.[1]
These were proclaimed as the ‘road of silk’ (Silk Road) by the German geologist
and geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen in his 19th century book ‘China’.[2] However, it is also said
that the term ‘Great Silk Road’ was first coined by Cjan Syan, a Chinese
traveller who lived in the pre-christian era.[3]
Following the collaborative construction of the Karakorum highway between China
and Pakistan in 1980, German researchers concluded from their excavations in
the region that the Historic Silk Road had not, in fact, been constructed by
the Chinese but had already been in use by tribes prior to the coming of the
Chinese, who eventually used this road as a part of new intercontinental
trading network; initially for the silk trade and later for other activities.[4]
The term Historic ‘Silk Road’ describes a series of trading networks that
facilitated the transfer of goods between Western markets in the Middle East
and Europe and Eastern markets, primarily in China. While the Caucasus mountain
passages and the Central Asian steppes were major obstacles to trade and
travel, there were, however, great oasis cities serving as way stations along
the route.[5] Chang’an, currently known as
Xi’an in China was the starting point of the journey. The caravan route then
divided into the North Road and South Road as it crossed the Western Territory
and met commercial roads in Rome.[6]
The main land routes of the Silk Road in B.C.150 were as follows:[7]
·
Changan-Yümen Kuang-Dun Huang-[‘Hami-Turphan’ (north route) or ‘Karaşar’
(middle route) or ‘Loulan’ (south route)]-Kuça-Aksu-Kashgar-[‘Semerkand-Buhara’
(north route) or ‘Baktra’ (middle route) or ‘Yarkent-Baktra’ (south
route)]-Merv-Schahrud-Hamadan-Palmyra-Antakya-the Mediterranean-Puteoli-Ostia-Rome
·
Changan-Yümen Kuang-Dun
Huang-Miran-Endere-Niya-Hotan-Yarkent-[‘Kashgar-Semerkand-Buhara’ (north route)
or ‘Baktra’ (middle route) or ‘Kashgar-Baktra’ (south
route)]-Merv-Schahrud-Hamadan-Palmyra-Antakya-the Mediterranean-Puteoli-Ostia-Roma.
During the Asian Hun State period, from the second century B.C. to the
fourth century A.D., there were three major routes on the Silk Road: the north,
middle, and south: [8]
·
North Route: Turphan-Urumchi (Urumçi)
·
Middle Route: Kurla-Kuça-Kashgar
·
South Route: Çarklık-Kashgar
·
West to East Route: Antakya-Syrian ports-Tigris and Euphrates
Reservoir-Caspian Sea-Balkh(Belh)-Pamir Plain-Kashgar-Hotan
·
A further important road to the East passed through the Caucasus and south
of the Caspian Sea.
According to another source, the routes of the Historic Silk Road were as
follows:[9]
·
North Route (depicted by Herodotus in B.C.450): Don River-Parthian
Region-Kansu (west of China).
·
South to East (estimation): Mesopotamia Region-Antakya and Gaziantep (Anatolia)-Iran-Pamir
Plain.
·
South to West (estimation): Gaziantep and Malatya (Anatolia)-Thrace
(Trakya)-İzmir (Aegea).
·
South Route to West (estimation): Trabzon and Sinop (Black Sea)-Alanya and
Antalya (Mediterranean)-Europe.
·
West to East Route (multimodal): A combination of Egyptian and Mesopotamian
Routes-Barygaza (a port city on Indian Ocean).
Map 1: The Historic Silk Road
Routes
Source: Shirin Akiner, “Silk Roads, Great Games and Central Asia”, Asian Affairs, 2011, 42:3, 392.
The Map 1 shows that the Historic Silk Road from China to Rome (Italy)
included both land and sea routes from East to West. In another source, the
Silk Road route from West to East by sea extends from Southern Europe through
Egypt, Arabia, Somalia, Persia, India, Java and then reaches China.[10] Marco Polo, explorer and
tradesman from Italy, also mentioned the Silk Road in his book “Il Milione”.[11] The outward and inward
routes he and his companions followed were as follows: Outward:
Venice-Acre-Trebizond(Trabzon)-Baghdad-Terbil-Ormuz-Balkh-Kashgar-Lanzhou-(Karakorum)-Lanzhou-Beijing-Chengdu-Pagan;
Inward: Pagan-Chengdu-Beijing-Hangchow-South China Sea-Sumatra-the Indian
Ocean-Arabian Sea-Ormuz-Terbil-Trebizond-Constantinople(İstanbul)-Venice.[12]
As will be seen the Historic Silk Road was actually series of different
routes indicating that it was a combination of multi-modal transportation ways.
However, it should also be noted that the routes are not definite as their
determination presents many difficulties i.e. names of
cities-territories-countries differ from those used in other periods when
attempting to compare them with those available in the various oriental and
occidential sources. For example, Hoço, an ancient Uyghur city in the Turphan
Valley, has been re-named as Kao Ch’ang by the Chinese: this name has never
been used by the Uyghur people.[13]
1.2. Commercial Structure of the Historic Silk Road
Uhlig says that civilisation started with silk. Silk, as one of the first
products to be produced/marketed in a capitalist manner, became not only a
symbol of wealth but also Capital in its own right. Moreover, it was the first
foreign exchange medium between West and East, the first with a convertible
value, and the only commodity equivalent to gold. Furthermore, silk was not
only used to make a fabric; it was the raw material for many other products and
used as a means to promote international relations.[14]
Good ideas and innovations travel far and easily. Historically, they spread
along trade routes. The Historic Silk Road, was, therefore, the vector by which
people, goods, ideas, beliefs, inventions, devices, and techniques were
transmitted. Among the various inventions that travelled its route were paper
(from China), the noria (irrigation waterwheel from Roman Syria), foodstuffs
(apples from Kazakhstan, oranges from China, grapes from the western regions).[15] As an example of a
transmitter of technique, Xueyi et al. studying monetary theory and policy in
China, set out the structure of economic activity in the various dynasties of
ancient China and offer the following details in their paper on monetary
structure for Europe and later North America:[16]
·
Monetary thought was accumulated by thinkers of various vocations in
ancient China.
·
Some monetary theories and concepts in ancient China developed earlier than
in Western countries.
·
Monetary policy was conducted regionally but overseen nationally in
Imperial China.
·
Monetary thought and social development facilitated each other in ancient
China.
·
Ancient monetary thought in China probably travelled along the Silk Road to
Western countries.
While silk is the best known, many other products were traded along the
Silk Road. Caravans moving towards China carried gold and other precious
metals, ivory, precious stones, alfalfa, grapes, sesame, pomegranates, walnuts,
cucumbers, carrots, lions, peacocks, elephants, camels, horses, and glass;
goods which were either unknown or not manufactured in China until the 5th
century A.D. Movements in the opposite direction included furs, ceramics, jade,
bronze objects, lacquer, bambooware, gunpowder, and iron.[17]
Another source lists some of the goods traded in different periods along the
Silk Road as follows: textile products, coral, topaz, wine, glassware, gold and
silver cups, indigo, spices, perfume, rubber, medical lubricants,
tortoise-shell, lapis lazuli, muslin, timber, medicine, pearls, diamonds,
rubies, sapphires, woven silk, and medicinal herbs. Human beings (slaves) were
also traded on these roads.[18]
Information on the organisation and schedule of caravans on the Historic
Silk Road is insufficient, and the frequency of caravans in the different
periods is also unknown. Some documents mention twelve caravans a year in the
1st century A.D. It is, however, uncertain if this number refers to one route
only or to all routes. On the other hand, some documents, state that caravans
were always on the roads, and there was no time when they could not be seen.[19] The Silk Road enriched not
only merchants but also peoples and cultures right across Eurasia.[20] In this context, a stream
of priests and monks also moved Eastward bringing with them the Nestorian,
Manichaean, and Buddhist religions and, later, Islam.[21]
It should be noted that illnesses too were carried on these routes. For
example, the most dreaded of them, the Black Death, or bubonic plague
devastated Europe in the late 1340s after spreading from China.[22]
It is asserted in one source that the heyday of the Historic Silk Road in
terms of transportation density was the 7th and 8th centuries A.D.,[23] while its height in terms
of political security and maintenance of the infrastructure was asserted to be
during the period of Mongol control over the entire transit route in the 13th
and 14th centuries A.D.[24] The latter is confirmed in
another source as “The Mongol expansion throughout the Asian continent from
around 1207 to 1360 helped to bring political stability and thus to populate
the Historic Silk Road”.[25] However, a further source
states that following the conquest of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258, transit
trade between East and West from the 13th to the 15th centuries A.D. was
carried out via Egypt, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean. Eventual explorations
of sea routes in 16th century caused the weaking of the Historic Silk Road.[26] In this context, sea
transportation with short term direct delivery, replaced long term intermediary
delivery-based journeys. That is, the Historic Silk Road was replaced by ships.[27]
2. The Modern Silk Roads
2.1. Birth of the New Silk Roads
The Silk Road of the past served the numerous traders, armies, and
adventurers as a communication and transport link between cultures and
economies. During the period of the Han Dynasty (B.C.206-A.D.220), the Silk
Road left its mark on the development of civilisations throughout Eurasia by
playing a unique role in foreign trade and political relations as possibly the
world’s first “internet” linking Asia to Europe and Africa. With the collapse
of the former Soviet Union, a revitalised Historic Silk Road is once again
expected to play an important role in the region's political stability and its
economic development.[28] Exploration for oil and
natural gas reserves being among the main factors for the renaissance of these
roads.
Three memorable metaphors about the region date from the 19th century:[29]
1.
The first is ‘The Historic Silk Road’ coined by Ferdinand von Richthofen in
1877. This encapsulates the sense of mystery and exotic splendour of the
ancient trade routes. Today, the current term ‘the New Silk Roads’ is used as a
metaphor for reconnection. It implies transport corridors, international trade,
oil and gas pipelines, and tourism.
2.
The second 19th century metaphor the ‘Great Game’, is thought to have been
invented by Arthur Conolly around 1840. It too evokes all the intrigue, daring,
and heroism of the Russo-British struggle for supremacy in the land north of
the Hindu Kush. Today’s ‘New Great Game’ is taking place as the great powers
continue their pursuit of rival political and economic goals. The main players
now being Russia, China, and the United States - the US taking the place of
Britain – with Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and India playing secondary roles. The
EU and Japan are also involved.
3.
Finally, ‘Central Asia’, the notional locus for the Historic Silk Road and
the Great Game is, in fact, a mythical area being no more than a term invented
in 1843 by the famous geographer and explorer, Alexander von Humboldt, to refer
to this ‘fuzzy’ region, somewhere between Europe and Asia.
The opening-up of Central Asia and the Caucasus has revived the use of two
of the above-mentioned historical metaphors -The Historic Silk Road and The
Great Game- to characterize the economic and political transition in these
regions. Currently, however, neither is applicable in their historical sense.
Moreover, the inherent contradiction in these ideas (that is, the Historic Silk
Road meaning international free trade, and the Great Game implying national
power and trade controls) may serve to mask some of the more interesting political
and economic realignments taking place as leaders in the Caucasus and Central
Asia seek to diversify their foreign policy options.[30]
It should, however, be noted that the new self confident and assertive Central
Asian states set the rules. So that whereas in the 19th century the great
powers set the agenda, it is now principally the Central Asian states that take
the decisions on the establishment of partnerships, doing business, and
permitting access to their resources.[31]
In terms of significant economic and political aspects, Central Asia is
important for India as it too searches for New Silk Roads. However, the best
short routes from India to Central Asia pass through Pakistan, Afghanistan or
China, and India’s relationship with these countries is tense due to past
battles. India, therefore, now avoids problems with China and Pakistan in order
to normalise their commercial relations[32]
and thereby benefit from the advantages of the Region. Central Asian economies
also attract South Asian countries. For instance, after Uzbekistan gained its
independence in 1991 South Asian entrepreneurs from Pakistan and Afghanistan as
well as India flocked to it and to other Central Asian economies, bringing
capital, information, and technology.[33]
In recent years, some efforts have been made to develop East Asia’s
economic potential. For example, South Korea wants to specialize in certain key
strategic industries while becoming the region's business hub. Russia wants to
exploit the vast eastern region for its natural resources and build a railway
connecting Europe to East Asia. Japan wants to end its economic crisis, while
China seeks to bring about a new era of prosperity for its people. However,
these aspirations are subject to change because of North Korea’s stated intention
to develop nuclear weapons. In the light of this, regional nations are obliged
to balance their economic priorities with issues of political and military
security.[34]
Japan, however, is initiating various strategies. In this context, in July
of 1997 its former Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced the start of
Japan’s new ‘Eurasian Diplomacy’. Recognising the fact that the Silk Road also
runs east he stated his conviction that it was time to develop a Pacific
perspective, to envision through Asian eyes a region encompassing Russia,
China, the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Oil and gas, while
important, are not the sole reasons for Japan to become involved. As an Asian
country it could serve as a non-Western example of successful modernisation and
forward-looking industrial policy.[35]
2.2. International Initiatives and the New Silk Roads
Regarded as being the godfather of geopolitics Halford Mackinder argued
more than a century ago that, “whoever controls the Eurasian ‘world island’
would control the world”. For this purpose, there are various initiatives,
already launched or yet to be started, under the umbrella title of the New Silk
Roads. Among these the Historic Silk Road takes its place at the core of
relevant projects. Economic and political aspects are certainly among the aims
of such initiatives, but it is also felt that the New Silk Roads could promote
security, prosperity, and connectivity within some of the most volatile,
impoverished, and isolated nations on the planet.[36]
Akiner states that the New Silk Roads are symbolised as being based on mutual
interest, peace, and stability and that it is a revitalisation of the Historic
Silk Road.[37]
The concept ‘the Modern Silk Roads or the New Silk Roads’ contains several
meanings depending upon the views/aims/projections of the countries and/or
country groups on the region. Major among such initiatives are the Transport
Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA), the Northern Distribution Network
(NSR-NDN), the Trans-Korean Railroad with the Trans-Siberian Railroad (TKR-TSR;
Iron Silk Road), and the Gulf-Asia Model. Brief information about these
initiatives is given below and their connection with the Historic Silk Road
revealed. As will be seen, the main factors for the establishment of the said
initiatives are oil and natural gas plus some others.
China and the Central Asian countries were among the main actors on the
Historic Silk Road. In this context, trade between these countries has always been
crucial and favoured by both sides. However, earlier relationships have faced
changes. Items such as jade, tea, silk, and rhubarb have been replaced by crude
oil, natural gas, weapons, and infrastructure. The Historic Silk Road is
regarded as having been revived in terms of new trade in energy. Central Asian
states have huge hydrocarbon potential which have not yet been fully explored
and they seek foreign participation in developing and transporting these
reserves. Russia, the Western countries and China are the influential partners
for the Central Asian states in terms of moving their hydrocarbon resources
and, accordingly there is a major struggle for dominance among these actors.
For example, following the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, China speedily
established diplomatic relations and signed a series of agreements on bilateral
economic cooperation with Central Asian states.[38]
One of the European Union’s (EU) projects designed to assist the former
Soviet Union countries with regard to the development of trade in Eurasia, is
the so-called renaissance of the Historic Silk Road, TRACECA. The concept was
first developed during an EU meeting held in Brussels in 1993 with the
declaration of the revitalisation of the ancient
Russia, has reacted to these developments. An announcement from Moscow in
July 1999 stated that it intended to levy duties on oil exported to non-Customs
Union CIS countries -this includes those countries most heavily involved in the
TRACECA programmes- to prevent Russian oil from being resold to Western Europe
at cheaper prices through alternative routes. Russian tax revenue losses may
well be real, however, Moscow’s actual message is more political than economic.
If the states around the Caspian Basin choose to enter into economic relations
against the interests of their more powerful neighbours, they are certainly at
risk in doing so. However, the situation in Central Asia and the Caucasus is
now very different from the 19th century when Russia and Britain competed for
influence among separate tribes in the original Great Game; these newly
independent states are no longer passive pawns in the process.[43]
The US, Russia, and China all have their own Central Asia integration
schemes in the security and economic spheres: China has the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO), Russia the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), and the US the New Silk Road (NSR).[44]
The NSR strategy, declared by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and senior US
officials in the first half of 2009 is a key aspect of the US plan to promote
stability in Central Asia following the departure of 33,000 American and NATO
troops from Afghanistan by 2014. As Clinton sees it, “commodity and energy
exports have the ability to reveal the potential of regional economies”. The
proposed NSR projects includes establishment of the following transit
corridors: completing the Afghanistan’s Ring Road; linking railways between
Afghanistan and Pakistan; constructing the
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline; implementing the
Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative (CACI); and forming a regional
electricity market by building a transmission line between Central Asia and
South Asia (CASA-1000).[45]
These new supply lines have been termed the Northern Distribution Network
(NDN) which underscores a demilitarized, commercial nature as well as an
open-ended vision of a multiplicity of supply routes to Afghanistan.[46] The central element of the
NSR is to develop and expand the NDN which aims to transport large quantities
of non-lethal supplies from Europe to the NATO troops in Afghanistan through
Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.[47]
The NDN Routes are as follows: Pakistan Route: Pakistan-Afghanistan; North
Route: Latvia-Russia-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan; South Route:
Georgia-Azerbaijan-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan; KKT Route:
Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan. While the creation of the NDN was
motivated by the U.S. military’s immediate logistical needs, its establishment
offers a unique opportunity for Washington to establish a New Silk Road, which
would help stabilize Afghanistan in the long term, and transform Eurasia too.[48]
The TKR-TSR, another extension of the New Silk Roads established between
Korea and Russia with the involvement of several other countries, has
implications for the North's domestic economy, inter-Korean relations, both the
Koreas' wider foreign relations and Russia's Asian policy. This linkage is also
of great importance to other major powers: China, Japan, and the U.S., all of
which have vital interests in the peaceful resolution of the division of Korea.
The other larger implications that emerge from consideration of the TSR-TKR and
from other similar programmes to develop Asia are as follows:[49]
·
All projects for Korean and trans-national regions of Asia's economic
development must overcome strong domestic opposition to succeed.
·
This programme shares a common denominator with other projects such as the
joint Russo-Iranian-Indian project and the TRACECA for developing Asian
infrastructure.
·
This programme is, implicitly or even explicitly, an effort to limit
China's political-economic power over Asia, especially the Korean peninsula and
Russia's Far East.
·
This programme and other tied projects represent individual parts of a much
larger process that aims to overcome major obstacles to development, security,
prosperity, and stability in Asia.
The Gulf–Asia model, another initiative between the Gulf and Asian
countries, has a simple target: the Gulf exports energy and energy-related
products, and imports Asian manufactured goods, construction services, food,
and labour. The fact that oil and gas is considered to be a strategic sector by
governments of both regions limits investment opportunities. Nevertheless, some
significant direct investments have been made. For example, national oil
companies (NOCs) in the Gulf have positioned themselves as strategic investment
partners with Asian customers.[50] In this context, for
example, the Gulf region is likely to meet China’s growing need for natural
gas. Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are, after Russia,
the second, third, fourth, and fifth natural gas holders of the world. Gulf
Region governments have also been opening their doors to foreign investment in
natural gas operations.[51]
An example of partnership in this model is as follows: Asian firms showed
great interest in Iraq after the country opened up its oil industry to foreign
companies in 2008, and they won several licences. China's main state oil
companies; China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China National Offshore
Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation
(SINOPEC; operating in Kurdistan) have secured strong footholds in the country,
alongside Western international oil companies. The financial markets of
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Viet Nam attract Gulf investors and have
relatively better foreign investment possibilities as they also offer
investment opportunities in the sectors in which Gulf investors are
experienced: real estate, energy, tourism, and banking. The Gulf States could
also be a hub for transhipment, re-export, and service provision, as shown by
Dubai's entrepot model which has made the UAE India's largest trading partner
since 2008.[52]
2.3. Commercial Potential of the New Silk Roads
Central Asia and the Caspian basin take centre place
in the New Silk Roads. The region is split between oil and gas-rich states such
as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan (Group A) and states
such as Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgystan (Group B) which lack
meaningful petroleum resources. The countries in Group A, rather than simply
being a transit corridor, expect to exploit their oil and natural gas reserves
as the means to revitalise their overall economies, while the countries in
Group B, facing different economic choices, hope to take advantage of their
geographic position to encourage the development of transportation
infrastructure, thus allowing them to share in the good fortune of their
neighbours’ oil and gas resources.[53]
Structural changes in the world economy have accelerated the economic
realignment of the two regions. China's economy grew fifteen-fold between 1980
and 2011 to become the world's second-largest after the US. By 2050, India is
expected to be the world's third-largest economy. On current trends, Asia could
account for half of global output by then. Even now Asia accounts for 50% of
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) trade, a big change from 30 years ago when some
80% of GCC trade was with the developed economies of Europe and the US.[54]
Given its geographic location and oil-producing capacity, the Middle East
will probably remain as the main supplier of energy to Asia. Imports already
meet 75% of Asian demand, and are expected to account for 90% by 2030. The
Middle East already supplies about 60% of China's oil needs.[55] There are various reasons
for this rise in China’s energy consumption, the first of which is its rapid
economic growth. While its share in the primary energy demand on a world scale
was 5% in 1971, by 1995 it had increased to 11%. In 1993 China’s crude oil
consumption was already more than its domestic production. Since then, its
import volume has increased and if this trend in economic activity continues,
China’s demand for oil could be as high as 7-12 million barrels per day (mbl/d)
by 2020.[56]
All Central Asian states come within the middle-income range of countries.
Information on these are as follows:[57]
·
Kazakhstan is the richest with its GDP. This is mainly because of its very
large territory and world-class reserves of oil, gas, uranium, and lithium. It
also has grain, cattle and other resources. According to one source, Kazakhstan
has oil reserves of 8.0 billion barrels (bbl) and 65.0 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas. Another source states that it has 5.4 bbl of crude oil reserves.[58] By 1998, oil accounted for
more than 60% of its exports.[59]
·
Turkmenistan, too, has huge gas reserves and is a major producer of cotton.
One source gives Turkmenistan oil reserves of 0.5 bbl and 101.0 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas.[60] According to the 2012
Statistical Review, it holds 11.7 percent of the world’s proven natural gas
reserves.[61] Oil and gas constitute 80%
of its revenue.[62]
·
Uzbekistan is a balanced economy with many different resources including
very large reserves of gold. It is also one of the top cotton producers of the
world; Bukhara, for instance, exported over a million tonnes of cotton in 1998,
150,000 of which were exported via TRACECA.[63]
·
The two mountain states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan both have some gold
and hydropower reserves. However, these are the poorest states.
Information on some of the countries in the Caucasian and Caspian regions
are as follows:
·
Armenia has a small-scale agricultural economic structure. According to the
2012 statistics, its GDP composition by sector of origin is as follows:
agriculture: 21.1%, industry: 37.7%, services: 41.2%. The country has no proven
crude oil and natural gas reserves as of 2012.[64]
·
Azerbaijan is relatively an industrial country. According to the 2012
statistics, its GDP composition by sector of origin is as follows: agriculture:
6%, industry: 63.8%, services: 30.2%. The country has 7 bbl proven crude oil
reserves and 849.5 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas reserves as
of 2012.[65]
·
Georgia is relatively a service based economy and it’s GDP composition by
sector of origin is as follows according to the 2012 statistics: agriculture:
7.8%, industry: 23%, services: 69.2%. It has 33.19 million barrels (mbl) proven
crude oil reserves and 93.41 bcm of natural gas reserves as of 2012.[66]
All initiatives are candidates designed to increase the commercial
potential of the countries related to the New Silk Roads. For example, the
NSR-NDN could generate huge economic advantages among both trading and transit
states. Some of these are as follows: [67]
Firstly, an overland route running from Lianyungang to Rotterdam via Xinjiang
and Central Asia would reduce the time it takes to transport goods from China
to Europe from 20-40 days to about 11 and lower costs from $167 to $111 per
ton, i.e. by over 30% while cutting the present journey time by half. Secondly,
a UN study has estimated that GDP across Central Asia would grow by 50% within
a decade if the related states cooperate with each other on fostering trade.
Thirdly, intercontinental trade is projected to increase Afghanistan’s GDP by
8.8-12.7% and 2-3% in Xinjiang.
3. The Silk Roads and Turkey
3.1. The Role of Turkey in the Historic Silk Road
The main route of the Historic Silk Road linking China with the Byzantine
Empire was, to a large extent, under the control of the Turks. Starting from
the north of Beijing the boundaries of the Turkic territories passed through
Iran, Khorasan, the Ural Mountains, and Caspian Sea to reach the Black Sea.
They neighboured the major states of those times; China, Iran, and the
Byzantine Empire. Thus the Historic Silk Road played an important role for
Turks in the establishment and improvement of their economic relations with
China, the Caucasus, Russia, India, and the Arab countries. The Turks played a
paramount role in making the Historic Silk Road famous and this is clearly
recognized in an Uzbek saying: ‘There are two big roads in the universe; the
Milky Way in the sky and the Silk Road on earth’.[68]
Turks also took part in relevant production and trade processes. For
instance, in the 6th A.D., Turks not only manufactured and sold very popular
gilded armour but also horseshoes, horse riding equipment, and farmers’ hand
tools. In this way they developed their economy, becoming the main exporter in
China to the West. Moreover, Iran was the fashion centre for Chinese elegance
in those times, as Paris was for Europe a hundred years ago. Turks were the
greatest beneficiaries of this situation as they were traders in silk from both
Iran and the Byzantine lands. That is, they were selling the silk of Iran and
the Byzantine lands to China which had once been the biggest exporter of this
commodity.[69]
Prior to the exploration of new seaways in the 17th century, India in the
Historic Silk Road’s eastern region had been one of the most important trading
centres. As a consequence it was regularly attacked by dynasties of Turks from
Central Asia and Afghanistan. India was ruled by Turkic dynasties from the 13th
to the 19th centuries. The most influential of these was the Mughal (Mongol)
Empire which ruled from 1526 to 1857. Turkic dynasties encouraged Turks to
spread from Central Asia so that a commercial network, mainly under the
management of Turkic administrators was established along the Historic Silk
Road from India to Anatolia in today’s Turkey.[70]
Current boundaries of Turkey have had connections with the Silk Road routes
throughout history. In this context;
·
During the time of the Asian Hun State between the 2nd century BC and the 4th
century A.D., the route from West to East included Antioch (Antakya), a
Rоman city then in Syria.[71]
·
In the 9th century A.D. the main commercial centres of the Parthian Empire
in the East and the Rome-Parthia frontier were Zeugma (Belkıs) on the bank of the
Euphrates and Antiocheia (Antakya) on the bank of the Orontes river (Asi).[72]
·
The outward and inward routes of Marco Polo and his companions included
cities of modern Turkey: Outward:
Venice-Acre-Trebizond(Trabzon)-Baghdad-Terbil-Ormuz-Balkh-Kashgar-Lanzhou-(Karakorum)-Lanzhou-Beijing-Chengdu-Pagan;
Inward: Pagan-Chengdu-Beijing-Hangchow-South China Sea-Sumatra-the Indian
Ocean-Arabian Sea-Ormuz-Terbil-Trebizond-Constantinople(İstanbul)-Venice.[73]
·
According to another source, many cities in Turkey were included in the
routes. Among them are; South to East: the Mesopotamia Region-Antakya and
Gaziantep (Anatolia)-the Iran-Pamir Plain; South to West: Gaziantep and Malatya
(Anatolia)-Thrace (Trakya)-İzmir (Aegea); North to West: Trabzon and Sinop
(Black Sea)-Alanya and Antalya (Mediterranean)-Europe.[74]
·
İzmir was the western end point of Asia and among the last cities on the
Historic Silk Road.[75] The Ottoman-Iran Wars between 1588-1628 adversely affected the
economy of the Armenians dealing with the silk trade and, as a consequence,
they re-directed their business from Aleppo to İzmir Harbour. Thus the Historic
Silk Road extending from East to West was; Iran Kashan, Kum, Tehran, Qazvin,
Tabriz, Yerevan, Kars, Erzurum, Tokat, Ankara, Afyon, Denizli (Laodicea),
Nazilli (Mastaura), Sultanhisar (Nysa), Aydın (Tralleis), Menderes Magnesias,
Selçuk (Ephesus), and İzmir. In this way İzmir regained its importance in the
business of the transportation of goods.[76]
At different periods, Turks took many measures to continue their connection
with the Silk Road. Some of which are given below:[77]
·
The Seljuks constructed good, soundly built, roads to ensure the safety of
transportation activities in Anatolia.[78]
·
The Ottoman Empire allowed commercial activities coming from Aleppo via the
Historic Silk Road, to flow directly to İzmir.
·
The aim of the Ottoman tax concessions that began in the 16th century under
the Capitulations was to redirect commercial activities to Anatolia and the
Silk Road. At that time many traders from the Netherlands, Britain, and the
Levantine came to the Ottoman Empire.
·
After the fall of Andalusia, the Ottoman Empire took some displaced Jews
under its protection. There were two reasons for such a decision, the first of
which was humanitarian and the second economic. In this context, the Ottoman
Empire, wishing to benefit from the Jewish banking experience, settled them in
the major trading cities of İzmir, Thessaloniki, and İstanbul in order that the
commercial flow be redirected away from South Africa and towards Anatolia and
inner Asia, that is, to the Silk Road.
However, due to the decline in the significance of the Historic Silk Road,
the following events concerning the Anatolian connection occured:[79]
·
As the Ottoman Empire weakened the Anatolian route lost its importance in
terms of being the commercial and cultural bridge between East and West.
·
At the end of the Ottoman period, the burgeoning railway system saw a
dramatic decline in traditional transport routes.
Currently, the Historic Silk Road is being revitalised in terms of its
touristic potential in addition to international initiatives aimed at meeting
economic and political targets. In this context, Turkey, in addition to its
involvement in the foregoing commercial activities, is undertaking various
restoration/renovation activities. For this purpose, 11 caravanserais on the
Anatolian routes have been restored by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism and
made ready for visitors. These are:[80]
Ağzıkara (Aksaray), Ak (Denizli), Alara (Antalya), Alay (Aksaray), Çardak
(Denizli), İncir (Burdur), Sarı (Nevşehir), Silahtar Mustafa Paşa (Malatya),
Sultan (Aksaray), Susuz (Burdur), Şarapsa (Antalya).
3.2. The Role of Turkey in the New Silk Roads
Due to its geo-strategic position, Turkey, in terms of its political and
economic aspects, is involved in most of the international initiatives relating
to the New Silk Roads. Here, I offer some information concerning its role and
the impact of the initiatives on the country. Turkey is involved in the
so-called Asian Silk Road (oil and gas pipeline projects), the European Silk
Road (TRACECA), and the American Silk Road (NSR-NDN). It is not involved in the
so-called Korean-Russian Silk Road (TKR-TSR) and the Gulfian Silk Road (the
Gulf-Asia Model) due to its distance from such initiatives.
The long-term stability of the Caucasian and Central Asian states will
depend on their ability to attract foreign direct investment to build their economies,
while at the same time restoring their traditional cultural and commercial
relations with Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Potential markets in Turkey and
Europe, however, already rely on Russian natural gas imports which are likely
to remain as a cheaper alternative to Caucasian or Central Asian gas for some
time. Turkmenistan has explored a variety of options to export gas to Turkey’s
markets through either Iran or via a cross-Caspian pipeline, but the capital
costs for the development of these routes make its gas more expensive.
Nevertheless, for strategic reasons Turkey decided on using Turkmen gas to
diversify its energy sources. For now, though, Russian or Azeri options remain
as the commercial routes of choice.[81]
In this context, Turkey is
actively involved in the international oil and natural gas pipeline projects.
As of 2013, the international crude oil pipeline projects (COPP) in line with
the Historic Silk Road routes are as follows: Iraq-Turkey (Kerkuk-Ceyhan) COPP
(two pipelines) and the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) COPP.
In addition to these the international natural gas pipeline projects (NGPP)
that Turkey is involved in through its state company ‘BOTAŞ’ as of 2013 are as
follows: Turkey-Greece-Italy NGPP (ITGI); Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria
NGPP (NABUCCO); Trans-Anatolian NGPP (TANAP); Iraq-Turkey NGPP; and
Trans-Caspian Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe NGPP.[82]
TRACECA is important for Turkey. Starting in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria,
Romania, Ukraine) the corridor passes through Turkey, crossing the Black Sea to
the ports of Poti and Batumi in Georgia. It then uses the transport network of
the Southern Caucasus. From Azerbaijan it crosses the Caspian Sea
(Baku-Turkmenbashi, Baku-Aktau) and meets the railway networks of the Central
Asian states of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan whose transport networks are
connected to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and eventually to China and
Afghanistan.[83] There are, however, some
barriers to the execution of the TRACECA. The conflicts between Turkey and
Armenia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia and Russia, and between Iran and the
USA, plus disputes over the the Caspian Sea oil fields, are major obstacles to
the realization of the project. In addition to these, regional instabilities in
Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia and in Nagorno (Mountainous) Karabakh, may cause
problems for the implementation of the Project. Furthermore, as the TRACECA
will be an alternative to the Moscow-centred trade and transport flows reaching
Europe, Russia is actively lobbying for alternative roads via its own
territory. In addition to this, as the TRACECA roads are opened up, the
northern countries will inevitably place increasing emphasis on improving
services in order to maintain the competitive advantage of their transport
corridors.[84]
Within the framework of the NSR-NDN, and with the planned US and NATO
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, the major powers are all competing to
increase their influence in Central Asia. Other states: India, Pakistan, Iran,
Turkey, and the EU have also involved themselves in this rivalry.[85] In this context, for
instance, Turkey is also involved in the network which comprises a rail link
starting in Latvia and passing through Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan; a
road route via Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for goods initially delivered to the
Manas Transit Centre near Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan); and a Caucasus pathway that
ferries cargo from the US and Europe to the port of Mersin (Turkey), and to
Poti (Georgia), for delivery via the Caspian Sea to Afghanistan.[86]
While giving particular importance to the revitalisation of the Historic
Silk Road by restoring its heritage sites, Turkey, as mentioned above, also
seeks to increase its role in the New Silk Roads. In this context, Ahmet
Davutoğlu, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, emphasized the projections
concerning the revitalisation of the Historic Silk Road and the importance of
taking part in the plans for the New Silk Roads.[87]
A senior official in the same Ministry also emphasized the significance of the
Historic-New Silk Roads and proposed various measures for their revitalisation.
In this context, while he placed emphasis on the missing section between
İstanbul and Beijing in the İstanbul-Europe-USA-China link in the context of
the Historic Silk Road, he recommended the following:[88]
·
The nations between China and Turkey have not yet been integrated into the
global economy. The most significant element in this chain is the need for
economic reconciliation between Turkey and Iran.
·
A strategic collaboration between Turkey, Iran, and Russia is a must for
the revitalisation of the Historic Silk Road.
·
As this would result in vital benefits for the West they should commit
themselves to fashioning this missing link.
3.3. The Impact of the New Silk Roads on Turkey’s Foreign Trade
As mentioned earlier, the New Silk Roads are on the revitalised Historic
Silk Road routes and their peripheral areas. The countries/territories of
today’s world involved in the Historic Silk Road -inclusive of its secondary
connections- are as follows:[89] Land Routes: China,
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal, India, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Russia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Armenia, and Turkey; Sea Routes: China, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Malaysia,
Indonesia, East Timor, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Oman,
Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt, Lebanon,
Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, and Italy. There
are 19 countries/territories on the land routes and 29 on the sea routes.
Excluding the repetitions in both routes, there are, as of today, some 43
countries/territories along the Historic Silk Road. This indicates a clear
connection between the Historic and the New Silk Roads.
Below, the impacts of the New Silk Roads on Turkey’s foreign trade are
given. For this purpose, the countries having direct relations with Turkey are
taken into account in terms of collaboration in the oil and gas projects, and
relevant assessments are made. In this context, details
concerning the international COPP of Turkey are available in Table 1.
Table 1: International COPP of Turkey (2013)
|
|
Lenght (km) |
Capacity [million barrels per annum (mbla)] |
||
|
Iraq-Turkey COPP (Kerkuk-Ceyhan) |
|
Turkey |
Total |
553 |
|
Line I |
641 |
986 |
||
|
Line II |
656 |
890 |
||
|
Grand Total |
1,297 |
1,876 |
||
|
Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey COPP (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) |
|
Turkey |
Total |
365 |
|
|
1,076 |
1,776 |
||
Source: BOTAŞ, Annual Report,
2011, Ankara, 29.
Currently, Turkey has two international COPPs, one of which is with Iraq,
the other with Azerbaijan and Georgia. While the first has two lines with a
total length of
Table 2: Crude Oil Transportation through Iraq-Turkey COPP (2002-11) [000 barrels (bl)]
|
Year |
2002 |
2003 |
2004 |
2005 |
2006 |
2007 |
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
2011 |
|
Amount |
175,667 |
60,278 |
37,685 |
13,167 |
12,932 |
43,700 |
132,941 |
167,467 |
144,590 |
163,276 |
Source: BOTAŞ, Annual Report,
2011, Ankara, 29.
According to the crude oil statistics of BOTAŞ, there was a decline in transportation
between 2002-07 due mainly to unrest in Iraq. From 2007 on, the trend was
upward, and for 2011 the amount moved was 163,276,000 bl.
Details of the international
natural gas pipeline projects (NGPP) in which Turkey is involved as of 2013 are
as follows: [90]
·
Turkey-Greece-Italy NGPP (ITGI):
3.6 bcma (billion cubic metres per annum) of gas to Greece and 8.0 bcma of gas
to Italy, a total of 11.6 bcma of gas will be transported to Europe from the
Caspian Region via Turkey.
·
Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria
NGPP (NABUCCO): The gas produced in Azerbaijan (Shah Deniz), Iraq,
Turkmenistan, and other Caspian sources, plus Egypt and Iran, is planned to be
the source for the line, the transportation capacity of which will be 31 bcma.
The total length of the pipeline is
·
Trans-Anatolian NGPP (TANAP): In
agreement with SOCAR (Azerbaijan), 10 bcma of Shah Deniz Phase-II gas will be
transported via the BOTAŞ natural
gas transmission system from the borders of Greece and Bulgaria to Europe.
·
Iraq-Turkey NGPP: This is an
integrated project, involving field development, production, gas processing,
and pipeline construction for natural gas reserves in Northern Iraq intended to
develop a natural gas corridor between Iraq and Turkey by transporting 10-12
bcma gas to Turkey and Europe.
·
Trans-Caspian
Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe NGPP: Natural gas produced in southern Turkmenistan
will be transported by pipeline via the Caspian Sea to Turkey and then to
Europe. 30 bcma of Turkmen gas will be transported through this pipeline, 16
bcma of which is to be supplied to Turkey, and 14 bcma to Europe.
In the context of the New Silk Roads in line with the Historic Silk Road routes,
the projects in which Turkey has roles include the following countries, which
means that they are foreign trade partners whose trade volume is given in Table
3:
·
COPP: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iraq
·
NGPP: Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Romania, Turkmenistan
·
TRACECA: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Iran, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan
·
NSR-NDN: Afghanistan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Pakistan,
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Turkey’s involvement in all these projects is expected to result in an
increase in volume of its foreign trade. Thus, such New Silk Roads are
increasing Turkey’s trade capacity as the Historic Silk Road did in the past.
Table 3: Foreign Trade of
Turkey with the COPP Countries (1996-2012) (000 $)
|
Countries |
|
1996 |
2000 |
2005 |
2010 |
2011 |
2012 |
|
Azerbaijan |
E (*) |
239,903 |
230,375 |
528,076 |
1,550,479 |
2,063,966 |
2,584,671 |
|
I (**) |
39,165 |
95,615 |
208,325 |
252,525 |
262,263 |
339,936 |
|
|
Georgia |
E |
110,319 |
131,771 |
271,828 |
769,271 |
1,092,321 |
1,253,309 |
|
I |
32,495 |
155,315 |
289,834 |
290,725 |
314,352 |
180,351 |
|
|
Iraq |
E |
--- |
--- |
2,750,080 |
6,036,362 |
8,310,130 |
10,822,144 |
|
I |
--- |
31,788 |
66,434 |
153,476 |
86,753 |
149,328 |
* Export, ** Import
Source: TÜİK, “Main Statistics; Foreign Trade”, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist, Retrieval date: 30.08.2013.
Between 1996 and 2012 Turkey increased both its export and import volume
with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Iraq. Crude oil had a paramount effect in this
upward trend. The trade volume with Iraq is particularly noteworthy from 2010
onwards. (pls. see Table 3)
Table 4: Foreign Trade of
Turkey with the NGPP Countries (1996-2012) (000
$)
|
Countries |
|
1996 |
2000 |
2005 |
2010 |
2011 |
2012 |
|
Austria |
E |
290,514 |
292,930 |
659,097 |
835,181 |
1,052,932 |
1,000,745 |
|
I |
545,485 |
516,754 |
940,056 |
1,439,448 |
1,736,366 |
1,634,272 |
|
|
Azerbaijan |
E |
239,903 |
230,375 |
528,076 |
1,550,479 |
2,063,966 |
2,584,671 |
|
I |
39,165 |
95,615 |
208,325 |
252,525 |
262,263 |
339,936 |
|
|
E |
156,906 |
252,934 |
1,179,313 |
1,497,384 |
1,622,777 |
1,684,989 |
|
|
I |
362,771 |
465,408 |
1,190,079 |
1,702,534 |
2,474,621 |
2,753,650 |
|
|
Greece |
E |
236,464 |
437,725 |
1,126,678 |
1,455,678 |
1,553,312 |
1,401,401 |
|
I |
284,959 |
430,813 |
727,830 |
1,541,600 |
2,568,826 |
3,539,869 |
|
|
Hungary |
E |
102,808 |
109,994 |
379,092 |
440,766 |
508,648 |
517,874 |
|
I |
94,420 |
216,262 |
946,238 |
1,382,213 |
1,494,488 |
1,184,452 |
|
|
Iraq |
E |
--- |
--- |
2,750,080 |
6,036,362 |
8,310,130 |
10,822,144 |
|
I |
--- |
31,788 |
66,434 |
153,476 |
86,753 |
149,328 |
|
|
Italy |
E |
1,446,419 |
1,789,307 |
5,616,755 |
6,505,277 |
7,851,480 |
6,373,080 |
|
I |
4,285,793 |
4,332,788 |
7,566,262 |
10,139,888 |
13,449,861 |
13,344,468 |
|
|
Romania |
E |
314,045 |
325,818 |
1,785,409 |
2,599,380 |
2,878,760 |
2,495,427 |
|
I |
441,290 |
673,928 |
2,285,592 |
3,449,195 |
3,801,297 |
3,236,425 |
|
|
Turkmenistan |
E |
65,657 |
120,155 |
180,635 |
1,139,825 |
1,493,336 |
1,480,052 |
|
I |
100,314 |
97,878 |
160,744 |
386,342 |
392,712 |
303,507 |
Source: TÜİK, ibid.
The volume of Turkey’s foreign trade with countries involved in the NGPP
has also increased. However, except for Azerbaijan and Iraq, partners in COPP, plus
Turkmenistan, all countries in this group export more than Turkey. That is,
Turkey has a trade deficit with these countries (pls. see Table 4). This
demonstrates that such projects are also aimed at removing the trade gap
between Turkey and these countries. Turkey is expected to raise its export
volume above its import volume with the countries in the NGPP via bilateral
trade agreements.
Table 5: Foreign Trade of
Turkey with the TRACECA Countries (1996-2012) (000 $)
|
Countries |
|
1996 |
2000 |
2005 |
2010 |
2011 |
2012 |
|
Armenia |
E |
--- |
--- |
--- |
16 |
218 |
241 |
|
I |
--- |
--- |
392 |
2,626 |
133 |
222 |
|
|
Azerbaijan |
E |
239,903 |
230,375 |
528,076 |
1,550,479 |
2,063,966 |
2,584,671 |
|
I |
39,165 |
95,615 |
208,325 |
252,525 |
262,263 |
339,936 |
|
|
Bulgaria |
E |
156,906 |
252,934 |
1,179,313 |
1,497,384 |
1,622,777 |
1,684,989 |
|
I |
362,771 |
465,408 |
1,190,079 |
1,702,534 |
2,474,621 |
2,753,650 |
|
|
Georgia |
E |
110,319 |
131,771 |
271,828 |
769,271 |
1,092,321 |
1,253,309 |
|
I |
32,495 |
155,315 |
289,834 |
290,725 |
314,352 |
180,351 |
|
|
Iran |
E |
--- |
297,521 |
235,785 |
912,940 |
3,589,635 |
3,044,177 |
|
I |
--- |
--- |
806,335 |
815,730 |
12,461,532 |
3,469,706 |
|
|
Kazakhstan |
E |
164,044 |
118,701 |
459,946 |
818,900 |
947,822 |
1,068,625 |
|
I |
100,595 |
346,376 |
558,900 |
1,392,528 |
1,995,115 |
2,056,086 |
|
|
Kyrgyzstan |
E |
47,100 |
20,572 |
89,529 |
129,902 |
180,241 |
257,470 |
|
I |
5,879 |
2,350 |
14,113 |
30,900 |
52,123 |
45,226 |
|
|
Moldova |
E |
14,397 |
26,232 |
81,108 |
148,209 |
208,885 |
224,464 |
|
I |
14,468 |
7,047 |
31,447 |
110,732 |
244,482 |
135,053 |
|
|
Romania |
E |
314,045 |
325,818 |
1,785,409 |
2,599,380 |
2,878,760 |
2,495,427 |
|
I |
441,290 |
673,928 |
2,285,592 |
3,449,195 |
3,801,297 |
3,236,425 |
|
|
Tajikistan |
E |
4,444 |
4,467 |
46,717 |
143,890 |
172,575 |
234,947 |
|
I |
2,786 |
16,511 |
47,309 |
283,689 |
324,283 |
345,178 |
|
|
Ukraine |
E |
267,539 |
258,121 |
821,034 |
1,260,423 |
1,729,760 |
1,829,207 |
|
I |
761,658 |
981,560 |
2,651,017 |
3,832,744 |
4,812,060 |
4,394,200 |
|
|
Uzbekistan |
E |
230,492 |
82,647 |
151,071 |
282,666 |
354,490 |
449,884 |
|
I |
58,054 |
85,794 |
261,466 |
861,373 |
939,882 |
813,287 |
Source: TÜİK, ibid.
While, in general, Turkey’s trade volume with all countries in TRACECA is
increasing, its exports are lower than the exports of member countries except
for Armenia (2011-12), Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova (pls. see
Table 5). Thus, TRACECA is also expected to result in a gradual increase in the
export capability of Turkey.
Table 6: Foreign Trade of
Turkey with the NSR-NDN Countries (1996-2012) (000 $)
|
Countries |
|
1996 |
2000 |
2005 |
2010 |
2011 |
2012 |
|
Afghanistan |
E |
2,114 |
8,053 |
113,401 |
259,791 |
275,969 |
289,915 |
|
I |
224 |
497 |
8,301 |
5,098 |
4,795 |
6,461 |
|
|
India |
E |
59,390 |
56,047 |
219,869 |
606,081 |
756,082 |
791,720 |
|
I |
258,174 |
449,307 |
1,280,473 |
3,409,938 |
6,498,651 |
5,843,638 |
|
|
Kazakhstan |
E |
164,044 |
118,701 |
459,946 |
818,900 |
947,822 |
1,068,625 |
|
I |
100,595 |
346,376 |
558,900 |
1,392,528 |
1,995,115 |
2,056,086 |
|
|
Kyrgyzstan |
E |
47,100 |
20,572 |
89,529 |
129,902 |
180,241 |
257,470 |
|
I |
5,879 |
2,350 |
14,113 |
30,900 |
52,123 |
45,226 |
|
|
Latvia |
E |
1,970 |
16,086 |
81,390 |
65,958 |
115,955 |
127,367 |
|
I |
3,426 |
11,950 |
2,622 |
71,360 |
129,787 |
160,296 |
|
|
Pakistan |
E |
77,875 |
52,857 |
187,554 |
248,147 |
213,672 |
276,127 |
|
I |
83,467 |
82,232 |
315,463 |
749,931 |
873,131 |
555,012 |
|
|
Russia |
E |
1,511,634 |
643,903 |
2,377,050 |
4,628,153 |
5,992,633 |
6,680,777 |
|
I |
1,921,139 |
3,886,583 |
12,905,620 |
21,600,641 |
23,952,914 |
26,625,286 |
|
|
Tajikistan |
E |
4,444 |
4,467 |
46,717 |
143,890 |
172,575 |
234,947 |
|
I |
2,786 |
16,511 |
47,309 |
283,689 |
324,283 |
345,178 |
|
|
Turkmenistan |
E |
65,657 |
120,155 |
180,635 |
1,139,825 |
1,493,336 |
1,480,052 |
|
I |
100,314 |
97,878 |
160,744 |
386,342 |
392,712 |
303,507 |
|
|
Uzbekistan |
E |
230,492 |
82,647 |
151,071 |
282,666 |
354,490 |
449,884 |
|
I |
58,054 |
85,794 |
261,466 |
861,373 |
939,882 |
813,287 |
Source: TÜİK, ibid.
Turkey shows a tendency towards an increase in its foreign trade with the countries
involved in the NSR-NDN too. In this group only Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Turkmenistan export less than Turkey (pls. see Table 6). Realization of this
project is also expected to be a factor towards increasing Turkey’s trade
relations with these countries particularly with regard to increasing its
export volume.
Conclusion
As the oldest and longest trading route in the world the Historic Silk
Road, established in the second century B.C., extended across continents,
oceans, and seas. While goods and commodities, initially inclusive of silk,
traded over these routes; inventions, devices, techniques, people, cultures,
and religions also moved along the Road. Experiencing its heydays during the
7th-8th and 13th-14th centuries A.D. its significance diminished, and by the
late 17th century it fell into relative disuse as a result of the exploration
of new sea routes and the rise of related transportation facilities. If
considered from the beginning of its existence in the 2nd century B.C. up to
the late 17th century, the total number of countries involved in the Historic
Silk Road -inclusive of its secondary connections in terms of land and sea
routes- are the following: Land routes: China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal,
India, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, and Turkey; Sea
routes: China, Viet Nam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, East Timor, Myanmar,
Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Oman, Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania,
Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Syria,
Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, and Italy; a total, in today’s terms, of some 43
countries/territories along both routes.
The Historic Silk Roads are being revitalised following the exploration for
oil and natural gas reserves, in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Central
Asian regions in particular. Resulting from these explorations, new areas of
conflict have arisen among nations, and the attention of most of the world is
now focused on this part of the globe. In the 19th century such conflicts were
thought of as ‘the Great Game’ and from then on many international initiatives,
with particular emphasis given to the region’s oil and natural gas reserves but
including weaponry and infrastructural activities, have been centred here.
Among the major international initiatives dealing with oil-natural gas-weapon
transportation and infrastructural services are; Oil Pipeline Projects (OPP),
Natural Gas Pipeline Projects (NGPP), Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia
(TRACECA), Northern Distribution Network (NSR-NDN), Trans-Korean Railroad with
the Trans-Siberian Railroad (TKR-TSR), and the Gulf-Asia Model. Described as
the New Silk Roads. In this context, the names of the initiatives could be read
as; the Asian Silk Road (OPP-NGPP), the European Silk Road (TRACECA), the
American Silk Road (NSR-NDN), the Korean-Russian Silk Road (TKR-TSR; Iron Silk
Road), and the Gulfian Silk Road (the Gulf-Asia Model). While China and the Central
Asian countries were among the main actors on the Historic Silk Road, many more
countries are involved in the New Silk Road projects. Turkey is engaged in the
majority of such initiatives (i.e. OPP, NGPP, TRACECA, and the NSR-NDN) in
terms of their economic and political aspects.
In this paper, the impacts of the New Silk Roads on the foreign trade of
Turkey are discussed. For this purpose, two international COPPs, one of which
is with Iraq, the other with Azerbaijan and Georgia, are taken into account.
According to BOTAŞ statistics there was an upward trend in the transportation
of crude oil from 2007-11: In the latter year this amounted to 163,276,000 bl. As of 2013 Turkey also became involved in the
following international NGPPs: Turkey-Greece-Italy NGPP (ITGI),
Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria NGPP (NABUCCO), Trans-Anatolian NGPP
(TANAP), Iraq-Turkey NGPP, Trans-Caspian Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe NGPP. When
these projects are completed, the foreign trade of Turkey is also expected to
increase gradually. In the context of the New Silk Roads in line with the Historic Silk Road
routes, the projects in which Turkey has role include the following countries:
COPP: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iraq; NGPP: Austria,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Romania, Turkmenistan; TRACECA: Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bulgaria, Georgia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan; The NSR-NDN: Afghanistan, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Latvia, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan.
An analysis of Turkey’s data on its foreign trade with the above-mentioned
countries shows that between 1996 and 2012 the trend was upward for both export
and import volumes. The data indicate that Turkey is currently increasing its
foreign trade with all countries involved in the New Silk Road projects.
Moreover, considering their potential Turkey is expected to raise its exports
to these countries to above its imports from them. It can be projected that
completion of such international projects will provide Turkey with many
economic and political advantages greater than those described above. Thus, the
New Silk Roads will increase the trading capacity of Turkey in addition to opening up other economic and political
advantages, just as the Historic Silk Road did.
* Assist. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Behzat Ekinci
Economics, FEAS, Mardin Artuklu University.
** “The Silk Roads from the Past to the Future and Their Interactions with
the Foreign Trade of Turkey”, Avrasya Etüdleri, Issue: 45, TİKA, Ankara, 2014,
7-42.
Bibliography
Akiner, Shirin. “Silk Roads, Great Games and Central
Asia”, Asian Affairs, 2011, 42:3,
391-402.
Başyurt, Erhan. “Hindistan, İpekyolu’nu arıyor”, Aksiyon, 15.02.1997, http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-2277-32-hindistan-ipekyolunu-ariyor.html, Retrieval
date: 27.05.2013.
Blank, Stephen. “Economics and security in Northeast
Asia: The iron silk road, its context and implications”, Global Economic Review: Perspectives on East Asian Economies and
Industries, 2002, 31:3, 3-24.
BOTAŞ. Annual
Report, 2011, Ankara, 29.
BOTAŞ. “International Projects”, http://www.botas.gov.tr/index.asp, Retrieval date:
28.08.2013.
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook;
Armenia”, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/am.html, Retrieval
date: 06.09.2013.
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook;
Azerbaijan”, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/aj.html, Retrieval
date: 06.09.2013.
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook;
Georgia”, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html, Retrieval
date: 06.09.2013.
Davutoğlu, Ahmet. “Beşinci Büyükelçiler Konferansı”,
İzmir Üniversiteler Platformu, 05.01.2013, İzmir, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-besinci-buyukelciler-konferansi-kapsaminda-izmir-universiteler-platformu-tarafindan-d.tr.mfa, Retrieval
date: 27.05.2013.
Demir, İdris. “Revival of the Silk Road in Terms of
Energy Trade”, Gaziantep Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 2010, 9:3,
513-514, 513-532.
Hichok, Michael Robert. “The other end of the Silk
Road: Japan's Eurasian initiative”, Central
Asian Survey, 2000, 19:1, 17-39.
IISS. “Still quite narrow: the Gulf–Asia 'new Silk
Road'”, Strategic Comments, 2011,
17:9, 1-3.
İsayev, Elbrus and Mustafa Özdemir. “Büyük İpek Yolu
ve Türk Dünyası (The Great Silk Road and Turkish World)”, Zeitschrift für die Welt der Türken, 2011, 3:1, 111-120.
Kaynak, Muhteşem. “Ulaştırmada Yeni Eğilimler ve
Türkiye’nin Bölgesel Lojistik Güç Olma Potansiyeli”, Avrasya Etüdleri, 2003, 3-18.
Kim, Younkyoo and Fabio Indeo. “The new great game in
Central Asia post 2014: The US “New Silk Road” strategy and Sino-Russian
rivalry”, Communist and Post-Communist
Studies, 2013, 46, 275-286.
Kuchins, Andrew C.; Thomas M. Sanderson and David A.
Gordon. “Afghanistan: Building the Missing Link in the Modern Silk Road”, The Washington Quarterly, 2010, 33:2,
33-47.
Leonard, Karen. “The Silk Road Renewed? South Asian
Entrepreneurs in Uzbekistan”, South Asia:
Journal of South Asian Studies, 2010, 33:2, 276-289.
Major, John. “Silk Road: Spreading Ideas and
Innovations”, http://asiasociety.org/countries/trade-exchange/silk-road-spreading-ideas-and-innovations, Retrieval
date: 10.07.2013.
Nurhan, Aydın. “Ekonomik Küreselleşme ve Türkiye”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ekonomik-kuresellesme-ve-turkiye-.tr.mfa, Retrieval
date: 27.05.2013.
Toniolo, Lucia; Alfonsina D'Amato; Riccardo Saccenti;
Davide Gulotta and Pier Giorgio Righetti. “The Silk Road, Marco Polo, a bible
and its proteome: A detective story”, Journal
of Proteomics, 2012, 7:5, 3365-3373.
TRACECA. “The Silk Road of the 21st century”, http://www.traceca-org.org/en/home/the-silk-road-of-the-21st-century, Retrieval
date: 27.08.2013.
TÜİK (Statistical Institute of Turkey). “Main
Statistics; Foreign Trade”, http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/UstMenu.do?metod=temelist, Retrieval
date: 30.08.2013.
Uhlig, Helmut. İpek
Yolu; Çin ve Roma Arasında Eski Dünya Kültürü, Çev.: Alev Kırım, İstanbul,
Okyanus Yayıncılık, 2000.
Wikipedia. “İpek Yolu”, http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C4%B0pek_Yolu, Retrieval
date: 27.05.2013.
Xie, Yichun; Robert Ward; Chuanglin Fang and Biao
Qiao. “The urban system in West China: A case study along the midsection of the
ancient Silk Road – He-Xi Corridor”, Cities,
2007, 24:1, 60-73.
Xueyi, Z.; Z. Yaguang and J. Whalley. “Monetary Theory
and Policy from a Chinese Historical Perspective”, China Economic Review (accepted manuscript),
doi:10.1016/j.chieco.2013.04.006, 2013.
Yalçın, Serkan. “Revitalizing the Eurasian Trade:
Prospects from the TRACECA Project”, Journal
of Academic Studies, 2007, 9:33, 26-38.
Yıldırım, Recep and Raziye Oban. “The importance of heritage roads on the
development of Western Anatolia and Izmir”, The 2nd International Geography
Symposium GEOMED 2010, Procedia Social
and Behavioral Sciences, 2011, 19, 90-97.